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The New York Rule as to Nervous
Shock
LYMAN P. WILSONt
A number of American courts (New York among them) still adhere
to the rule which denies damages flowing from fright or other nervous
shock, unless such mental state is caused or accompanied by some
actual contact with the person.' This rule is not one of those historical
remnants which in so many corners of the law find justification in an
ancient if not revered ancestry. Its beginnings are modern and have
no connection with the obscure past. To a Roman lawyer, the rule
would appear to be a peculiar subversion of justice.

"It may * * * be

noted as a curious fact that damages for mental suffering, which our
courts find so difficult, and frequently impossible to estimate, were the
rule in the tort of iniuriaeat Roman Law. The attitude of not a few
American courts, which have deliberately deniedredressin thesecases
because of an assumed -difficulty in determining the money value of
mentalcdistress, would have been incomprehensible to a Roman magistrate. American practice, is, of course, determined by the fact that the
theory of damages is compensatory, while juries are inclined to estimate them upon a penal basis. We might look with a little envy upon
' 2
a system, which in this respect derived its theory from its practice.
This refusal to allow damages for injuries flowing to a plaintiff through
nervous shock alone is a distinct anomaly. Courts freely admit the
power of mental states to produce actual physical disorder and illness.
The language of Allen, J., in Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. R.,3 is typical:
tProfessor of Law at Cornell University.
'See earlier annotations in this journal: 5, 489; 1I, 262. It is not intended
here to cite other authorities at length. The following are a few of the articles
bearing upon the propriety of an award of damages for mental suffering: Ainslie,
Damagesfor Physical Injuriesfrom Nervous Shock, 8 Va. L. Reg. 236,,311; Albertsworth, New Interests in the Law of Torts, io Calif. L. Rev. 466, 487; Bohlen, The
Right to Recover for Injury Without Impact, 41 Am. L. Reg. 141; Burdick, Tort
Liabilityfor Mental Disturbance and Nervous Shock, 5 Col. L.Rev. 179; Clifton,
Action for Mental Suffering Unaccompanied by Physical Injury, 57 Cent. L. J. 44;

Collier, Shock as Actionable in Negligence, 79 Cent. L. 3. 204; Goodrich, Emotional
Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 Mich. L. R~ev. 497; Lotz, Mental Suffering, 55
Cent. L. J. :202; Moses, Are Bodily Injuries Resultingfron Nervous Shock Actionable? 20 Nat. Corp. R~ep. 81, 117; Parry, Nervous Shock as a Cause of Action in
Tort, 41 L. Q. Rev. 297; Smith, Torts WithoutParticularNames, 69 U. Pa. L. Rev.
91; Tibbetts, Neurasthenia,the Result of Nervous Shock, 59 Cent. L. 3. 83, Throckmorton, Damagesfor Fright, 34 Har. L. Rev. 26o.
2Radin, Fundamental Concepts of the Roman Law, 12 Calif. L. Rev. 481, 486.
3168 Mass. 285, 290, 47 N. E. 88, 38 L. R. A. 512, 6o Am. St. Rep. 393 (1897).
Annotated: ii Har. L. Rev. 202.

NEW YORK RULE AS TO NERVOUS SHOCK
"The exemption from liability for mere fright, terror, alarm, or
anxiety does not rest upon the assumption that these do not constitute an actual injury. They do in fact deprive one of enjoyment and
of comfort, cause real suffering, and to a greater or less extent disqualify one for the time being from doing the duties of life * * *
It must be admitted that a timid, or sensitive person may suffer not
only in mind, but also in body from such acause. Great emotionmay
and sometimes does produce physical effects." The significance of an
admission that it is possible, with the aid of medical science, to trace
the injurious effects of the defendant's act through an intervening
mental state to an actual physical disorder is too clear to require extended comment. Perhaps it is not too much to assert that such resuits are matters of common knowledge. If then, in a given case, it is
possible thus to trace the plaintiff's disordered condition back to the
act or omission of the defendant, as one of the reasonably-to-beanticipated results thereof, we have all of the elements which are
usually thought sufficient to spell out a wrong. Therefore, when a
court denies a recovery in such a case it must face the duty of explaining its apparent departure from the principles usually invoked.
To their credit let it be said that the courts have been entirely frank
in stating their reasons for departing from the customary rule.
Uniformly, these statements show a basic distrust of the legal machinery as a measuring device. Ordinarily it is not indicated whether
the distrust arises from the supposed credulity of the jury, or from
the similar liability that the jury will be unduly swayed by their own
emotions, or possibly from the feeling that in suzch a case no reliance
may safely be placed upon the word of interested litigants, who
know that it will be impossible to impose any effective check upon
their testimony. But there usually is the unequivocal assertion that
there is no guarantee of the actuality of causation in such a case, and
that therefore the customary tests for fixing responsibility must be
disregarded. In other words, legal theory must yield to practical
experience. The rule therefore is purely pragmatic, and finds justification only to the extent that it is necessary to invoke such an exception to keep the machinery of the law from working harm. The
statement of the Court of Appeals of New York in the Mitchell case 4
rather clearly chooses the last of these positions. "If the right to
recovery in this class of cases should once be established, it would
naturally result in a flood of litigation in cases where the injury may
be easily feigned without detection, and where the damages must
4
Mitchell v. Rochester, etc., R. R. Co., I5I N. Y.
L. R. A. 781, 56 Am. St. Rep. 6o4 (1896).
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rest upon mere conjecture or speculation. The difficulty which often
exists in cases of alleged physical injury, in determining whether they
exist, and, if so, whether they are caused by the negligent act of the
defendant, would not only be greatly increased, but a wide field
would be opened for fictitious or speculative claims. To establish
such a doctrine would be contrary to principles of public policy. * * *
These considerations lead to the conclusion that no recovery can be
had for injuries sustained by fright occasioned by another, where
there is no immediate personal injury."
Much the same idea is expressed in slightly different language in
the Spade case :' "It would seem therefore that the real reason for refusing damages sustained from mere fright must be something different; and it probably rests upon the ground that in practice it is impossible satisfactorily to administer any other rule. The law must be
administered in the courts according to general rules. Courts will
aim to make these rules as just as possible, bearing in mind that they
are to be of general application. But as the law is a practical science
having to do with the affairs of life, any rule is unwise, if in its general
application it will not as a usual result serve the purposes of justice.
* * * We remain satisfied with the rule that there can be no recovery
for fright, terror, alarm, anxiety, or distress of mind, if these are unaccompanied by some physical injury; and if this rule is to stand, we
think it should also be held that there can be no recovery for such
physical injuries as may be caused solely by such mental disturbance,
where there is no injury to the person from without. The logical
vindication of the rule is that it is unreasofable to holdpersons,who
are merely negligent, bound to anticipate fright and to guard against
the consequences of fright; and that this would open a wide door for
unjust claims, which could not successfully be met." Disregarding
the probable error of the court in the matter of specific foreseeability
of fright, complaint, if any, must be directed to the court's distrust of
its own discernment and judgment. It is extremely difficult to believe that courts and juries are credulous to the degree which this
excerpt pictures, yet one of our most revered jurists, Justice Holmes
himself, subscribes to this principle inthefollowinglanguage: "As has
been explained repeatedly, it is an arbitrary exception, based upon
the notion of what is practicable, that prevents a recovery for visible
illness resulting from nervous shock alone.6 * * * But when there
has been a battery and the nervous shock results from the same
5

Supra, n. 3.
GHere citing the Spade case, supra, n. 3, and Smith v. Postal Telegraph-Cable
Co., 174 Mass. 576, 55 N. E. 38o, 47 L. R. A. 323, 75 Am. St. Rep. 374 (1899).
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wrongful management as the battery, it is at least equally impracticable to go further and to inquire whether the shock comes through the
battery or along with it. Even were it otherwise, recognizing as we
must the logic in favor of the plaintiff when a remedy is denied because the only immediate wrong was a shock to the nerves, we think
that when the reality of the cause is guaranteed by proof of a substantial battery of the person, there is no reason to press further the
exception to general rules." 7
Parenthetically, it should be remarked that this problem is not to
be confined to the field of tort, for it must necessarily intrude in all
those cases of breach of contract in which the chief item of damage is
that for emotional disturbance. For example, take any of the "food
cases." If a patron of a restaurant is furnished food, which, being
unfit for human consumption, makes him ill before he has consumed
any of it, the problem is at once raised whether, in an action going
upon the theory of warranty of quality, the mental upset of the
patron shall be considered as aggravating the damages, or whether the
patron shall be limited to the much narrower field of difference of
value between promise and performance. The problem of reality of
causation is here the same, though in making the award in such
cases the courts have almost never specifically recognized this fact.
Without going further into the details underlying the situation,8
it seems both safe and fair to accept the rule at the face value placed
upon it by those courts by which it has been approved. It is a rule
supposedly founded upon experience, offering an exception to a principle normally announced, and justified as an exception upon the
ground that it produces more accurate results in practice. Since the
7
' H-omans v. Boston El. Ry., I8O Mass. 456, 457, 62 N. . 737, 57 L. R. A. 291,
91 Am. St. Rep. 324 (1902). Lord Wensleydale makes a very similar statement
in Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577, 598 (i86I). "Mental pain or anxiety the
law cannot value and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act causes
that alone; though where a material damage occurs, and is connected with it, it is
impossible that a jury in estimating it, should altogether overlook the feelings of
the party interested. For instance, where a daughter is seduced, however deeply
the feelings of the parent may be affected by the wicked act of the seducer, unless the daughter is also a servant, the loss of whose service is a material damage
which the jury has to estimate; when juries estimate that, they usually cannot
avoid
considering the injured honour and wounded feelings of the parent."
8
Recently annotated cases include the following: Hanford v. Omaha & Council
Bluffs St. Ry., 203 N. W. (Neb.) 643 (1925); annotated: 24 Mich. L. Rev. 3"1.
Kenny v. Wong Len, 128 Atl. (N. H.) 343 (1925); annotated: II CORNELL
LAW QUARTERLY 262.
Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244
(1924); annotated: 25 Col. L. Rev. 502, 38 Har. L. Rev. 687, 11 Va.L. Reg. n. s.
235. Hambrook v. Stokes Bros. (r925), i K. B. i4I (1924), W. N. 296,41 T. L. R.
125, 132 L. T. 707, 94 L. J. (K.B.) 435, annotated: 41 L. Q. R. 297, 2 Camb.
L. J. 247, 16o L. T. 185, 58 Ir. L. T. 309, 73 U. Pa. L. Rev. 280, 34 Yale L. J.

554, 25 Col. L. Rev.
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For an extended review of authorities see, Simone v. Rhode Island Co.,
202, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 740. (1907).

R. I. 186, 66 Atl.
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justification by results is claimed for it, no fairer test could be asked
than the consideration of the manner in which the rule operates when
applied. In this connection certain recent cases offer both entertainment and food for thought.
In 19161 a guest at a hotel objected to the presence of a mousein a
kidney saute with which he had been served. He had eaten a portion
of the dish, had transferred more from the casserole to his plate, and
was then horrified, according to his statement, to discover upon his
plate half of the body of a dead mouse, while the other half reposed in
the casserole. He claimed to have been made violently ill. While this
case seemingly goes on the theory of warranty of fitness for food, the
only external guarantee of the reality of his illness, such as is demanded in the cases above cited, lies in the fact that he had eaten
some of the food which had been in contact with the mouse, and had
actually lifted part of the mouse with his spoon. While the reported
decision fails to state specifically whether the illness was the result of
the harmful nature of the food, the manner in which the facts are set
forth leave the impression that the physical condition of the plaintiff
was caused solely by the sight of the mouse. The fact that the court
remains silent upon the rule of the Mitchell case, and lays no stress
upon the theory of the action leaves room for questioning whether the
court is not adroitly dodging the application of the Mitchell case.
In a later decision in the Appellate Division10 the court of theSecond
Department seems to consider these omissions to be of significant
weight.
In the quite recent case of Sider v. Reid Ice Cream Company0 the
plaintiff was nauseated and made ill by the sight of a dead cockroach
imbedded in a charlotte russe, which she was then engaged in eating.
She had not touched nor eaten any portion of the insect. The defendant relied upon the Mitchell case, and the court wisely ignored the
opportunity to make use of an obvious sophistry to the effect that the
requirements of that rule were technically satisfied by reason of the
fact that the patron had touched a portion of the food which in turn
had touched the dead insect. Instead, the court stood squarely
upon the ground that there is no reason for distinguishing between the
cases in which the mental distress was caused by wilful act, where
recovery is allowed without any question, and those in which the
distress was caused by some negligent omission. The court said:
OBarrington v. Hotel Astor, 184 App. Div. (N. Y.)317, 17z N.Y.S. 840 (1918),
annotated: 13 Bench & Bar n. s. 198, 32 Har. L. Rev. 71, 17 Mich. L. Rev.261,
4 Va.
Leg. Reg. n. s. 793, 46 Wash. L. Rep. 675, 47 id. 134, 28 Yale L. J. 294.
'0 Sider v. Reid, 125 Misc. (N. Y.) 835, 836, 211 N.Y.S. 562 (1925), annotated:

26 Col. L. Rev. 365.
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"There seems to be no reason for the rule announced in the Mitchell
case. It is said that the rule was adopted as one of public policy, or as
one of necessity to avoid the perpetration of fraud. Whatever may
have been the prevailing conditions when this rule was announced,
there is now no need of it upon the score of public policy or necessity.
The rule has not been applied in a case like the one under consideration, where a foreign substance was contained in a food that was
served by defendant. [Citing the Barrington case.9] * * * We
think this whole subject should receive the further consideration of
the appellate courts."
In the very recent case of Carroll v. New York Pie Baking ComPany" the plaintiff complains that she was made ill when she discovered several large cockroaches imbedded in the lower crust of the
piece of pie which she was then eating. "They were crushed to such
an extent that they are said to have resembled butterflies." Jaycox,
J., attempts to distinguish the Mitchell case as follows: "In the
Mitchell case the plaintiff sought to recover for fright and the injuries resulting therefrom. In this case the recovery is not based
upon fright. The plaintiff claims a physical injury. '"" The inference
thus presented is hardly a fair one. There was physical injury in the
Mitchell case, an injury far more serious than the mere unburdening
of an insurgent stomach. "She [the plaintiff, Mitchell] testified that
from fright and excitement caused by the approach and proximity of
the team she became unconscious, and also that the result was a miscarriage and consequent illness. Medical testimony was given to the
effect that the mental shock which she then received was sufficient to
produce that result.""
It is said in the Carroll case 4 that since a recovery was clearly
allowable if a portion of the foreign substance were eaten and were
followed by illness, it was proper to go a step further. "If the article
of food, when cut, had emitted an offensive odor, which nauseated
the plaintiff, her right to recover in this action would have been clear."
Why? Is the court inviting the use of a sophistry to the effect that an
odor, after all, is composed of very minute particles of the object
carried into contact with the nasal membranes, and that therefore
there is sufficient "touching" to satisfy the rule? The court also
states that odors constitute "nuisances," and that, though nuisances
arising from disagreeable sights are less common than other kinds,
App. Div. (N. Y.) 240, 213 N.Y.S. 553 (Jan.
N. Y. S. 553 (1926).
laSutpra, n. 4, at p. io8.
1"213 N. Y. S. 553, 554 (1926).
"215
12213

22,
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they do exist. But to call a thing a "nuisance" does not give reasons
for imposing liability. The use of this term rather begs the question.
The court later attempts to distinguish the Mitchell case in the following language: "The plaintiff in this [Carroll]case makes no claim that
she was frightened. There is nothing about a cockroach, or several
cockroaches, that would cause fright, especially when dead and
crushed to such an extent that they resemble butterflies." This is
substituting the less for the greater with a vengeance. Is there any
one of us who would not prefer nausea, with any attendant consequences, to a downright case of fright?
Whatever may be the feeling about the reasoning by which it is
reached, the result in the Carroll case seems eminently proper. A
return to basic principles, if possible, is greatly to be desired. The
only justification of the Mitchell case has been the claim of practical
expediency, i. e., ease of application and exclusion of spurious claims.
As to the first, no court has a normal right to purchase ease of administration at the expense of justice, and it is doubtful whether a court
will ever, except in an extreme case, do so. The question then
revolves around the second point, the danger of false claims. This,
of course, is a question of fact. In its determination the state of development of medical science must be considered, and whenever it
becomes possible with fair accuracy to distinguish the feigned mental
state from the real, the sole ground of support for the Mitchell case will
have been removed. To many courts it has seemed that such a point
was reached long ago, and certainly this feeling is strong in the minds
of those New York courts which have recently been called upon to
apply the rule. If their strugglds are any evidence, the rule is not easy
to apply. If theyfeelcompelled to go to present lengths to avoid arbitrarily fixed results, we may be justified in questioning whether in
practice, the rule is producing approximate justice. Whenever a mechanically applied rule becomes unjust a crop of absurd exceptions is to
be expected. These are now being proposed for the rule of theMitchell
case in such numbers as to force the conclusion that the "whole
subject should receive further consideration from the appellate
courts." The rule of the Mitchell case was neither just nor logical,
and it is open to serious question whether experience has proved it
practically expedient.

